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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
RONALD DEAN UDY, : Case No. 20100726-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The trial court originally imposed sentence in this case on May 3, 2010. 
Thereafter, on August 3, 2010, the trial court issued an amended Sentence, Judgment, 
Commitment. Defendant/Appellant Ronald Dean Udy timely appeals the amended 
Sentence, Judgment, Commitment. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (Supp. 2010). The original Sentence, Judgment, Commitment is 
in Addendum A. The amended Sentence, Judgment, Commitment is in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Issue I: Whether the trial court violated state and federal protections against 
double jeopardy when it increased Udy's sentence after Udy had gained a legitimate 
expectation of finality in the trial court's original judgment. 
Standard of Review. This issue involves a question of law. See State v. Holm, 
2006 UT 31,1J10, 137 P.3d 726; State v. Harris. 2004 UT 103, H1J21-24, 104 P.3d 1250. 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Preservation. Defense counsel preserved Udy's double jeopardy claim by 
questioning the trial court's authority to amend the sentence at the August 3, 2010, 
review hearing and by filing a Motion to Correct Sentence under rule 22(e) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. R. 235-60; 288:4-5. Regardless, this Court can review the 
issue under rule 22(e) because a sentence imposed in violation of double jeopardy is an 
illegal sentence that must be vacated. See State v. Candedo, 2010 UT 32, ^9, 232 P.3d 
1008; State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, ffi[3-4, 6, 48 P.3d 228; supra at Part LB. 
Issue II: Whether the trial court violated Udy's right to allocution and to due 
process when it increased his sentence without granting him or his counsel an opportunity 
to address the court and when it based the increased sentence on information that was not 
reasonably reliable and relevant. 
Standard of Review. This issue involves a question of law. See Holm, 2006 UT 
31,110: Harris, 2004 UT 103,1ffl21-24. 
Preservation. Defense counsel preserved this issue when he repeatedly attempted 
to speak on Udy's behalf at sentencing, but was prevented from speaking by the trial 
court. R. 288:1-5. Regardless, this Court can reach this issue under the plain error 
doctrine or rule 22(e). First, this Court will reverse for plain error where ""'(i) t a l n e r r o r 
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful.'"" State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, «[|6, 18 P.3d 1123 (citations omitted). 
Second, a sentence imposed in violation of the right to allocution and the right to due 
process is an illegal sentence that must be vacated. See Candedo, 2010 UT 32, ^9; 
Telford, 2002 UT 51, ffi[3-4, 6; supra at Part II.B. 
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RELEVANT STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the following statutes, rules, and constitutional provision are in 
Addendum C: 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (2008); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 2010); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22; 
UtahR. Civ.P. 58A; 
Utah Const, art. I, §12; 
U.S. Const, amend. V & XIV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Udy was charged with one count of Unlawful False Statements, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§61-1-16 (2000) & 61-1-21 (Supp. 2001), two 
counts of Securities Fraud, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§61-
1-1 (2000) & 61-1-21 (Supp. 2001), and one count of Sales by an Unlicensed Broker-
Dealer or Agent, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-3(3) 
(2000) & 61-1-21 (Supp. 2001). R. 1-12. 
On May 3, 2007, Udy waived the preliminary hearing. R. 104-05; 284. 
Thereafter, on December 3, 2007, Udy entered a plea in abeyance to one count each of 
Unlawful False Statements and Securities Fraud; the remaining counts were dismissed. 
R. 125-33; 285:1-6. As part of the plea agreement, Udy agreed to pay back his creditors 
(the victims in the case) and to have no further violations. R. 134-35; 136-41; 285:1-2. If 
Udy completed the 36-month period successfully, the charges would be reduced to class 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A misdemeanors and no sentence would be imposed. R. 136-41; 285:1. If, however, he 
failed to comply with the terms of the agreement, the pleas would be entered as 
convictions and sentence would be imposed. R. 136-41; 285:1-6. 
On July 21, 2009, the State filed a motion to revoke the Plea in Abeyance, arguing 
Udy violated the agreement when, nine days after he entered the plea, he borrowed 
$50,000 in exchange for a promise of 20% interest. R. 142-46. Following an evidentiary 
hearing on January 25, 2010, the trial court held that Udy violated his plea in abeyance, 
entered convictions for Unlawful False Statements and Securities Fraud, and ordered a 
presentence report (PSR). R. 167; 286:4-5. 
The PSR was prepared for the sentencing hearing scheduled for May 3, 2010. It 
placed Udy in a "Low Risk Needs5' category. R. 174:2. It also noted that Udy's family 
provided "a great support system"; and that Udy knew "what he did was wrong,55 felt 
"terrible for his actions,55 and intended to pay all of the creditors back. R. 174:2, 3-4. 
Despite these circumstances, the PSR "deviated from the recommended sentencing 
guidelines55 of 19.2 months of probation and recommended instead that Udy be sentenced 
to prison "due to the amount of money involved and the effect it has had upon the 
victims.55 R. 174:1, 4, 7-8. In making this recommendation, the PSR acknowledged 
Udy5s intent to repay the creditors with a $20 million commission he anticipated 
receiving. R. 174:4. The PSR, however, assumed that defense counsel would "be able to 
handle the distribution of the money55 from the commission and that Udy's incarceration 
would "not affect the repayment of these funds to the victims.55 R. 174:4. 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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At the May 3, 2010, sentencing hearing, the trial court found no legal reason not to 
proceed with sentencing. R. 287:3-4. It then discussed the PSR with defense counsel, R. 
287:3-4, and heard statements regarding the appropriate sentence from defense counsel, 
Udy, the State, and the creditors. R. 287:4-51. 
First, defense counsel argued that the PSR's recommendation for prison was 
inappropriate because Udy had not acted with the intent to victimize his creditors. R. 
287:4, 6-8. "This case is not about Mr. Udy making a bunch of false statements to his 
creditors or taking money that he was stating to use for some specific purpose and using 
it to take a vacation or to buy his car." R. 287:46. He "got into trouble with the law" 
because "he didn't report some promissory notes, he lost his license, and then he 
continued to do what he's been doing over the last 30 years . . . so that he could continue 
and close his deals and get people paid off." R. 287:46. His actions were "illegal," but 
he wants to make amends. R. 287:46-49. He entered the plea in abeyance so he could 
pay back the creditors at the "risk that if he could not pay off [the creditors], he would 
lose the benefit of the plea in abeyance." R. 287:48. Thereafter, "[h]e made a mistake 
with obtaining some other money, and therefore, he lost his plea in abeyance." R. 
287:48-49. But he still wants "to pay everybody every dime including interest," even if it 
means that he will be "broke and living on the street." R. 287:6. For the past year, he 
had been working eighty hours a week on a project that he believes will soon earn him a 
$15 million commission and enable him to pay back all the creditors. R. 287:7-8. 
Second, Udy accepted responsibility for "the wrong things" he had done, 
apologized "to the State for the laws" he had broken, and apologized to the creditors. R. 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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287:9-11. He also expressed remorse for his actions and thanked the creditors for their 
patience. R. 287:10. He ftirther explained that he was "doing everything" he could to 
pay back the creditors with interest. R. 287:10. In particular, for the past year, he had 
been working on "an art project" that was "valued at $600 million" in Victorville, 
California. R. 287:8-9. The project had "tak[en] so long" to complete because it had 
required "an insurance wrap." R. 287:9. But now the insurance wrap had been acquired 
"through Prudential Assurance of America," and the deal would soon be completed. R. 
287:9. He was sure that "the results of [his] efforts" on the art project would enable him 
to "make all of [his] clients whole." R. 287:11, 50. He then placed himself at the court's 
"disposal" to "decide [what] to do with [him]." R. 287:11. 
In response to the court's questions, Udy explained that the creditors' money had 
been invested in "real estate and other investments," but then "the bottom dropped off of 
the real estate" market and he was no longer able to pay the creditors back. R. 287:12-13. 
Thereafter, he lost most of the property because he was not "able to keep it." R. 287:13. 
At that time, an acquaintance approached him about the art project and "said that if [he] 
could put it together that they would pay [him] a hefty commission on it." R. 287:13. 
And so he became "a middle man" who brought "the right people together" and in return 
he would soon receive a "substantial" commission. R. 287:13. But if he was incarcerated 
and, therefore, unable to complete the deal, the deal would be "gone because . . . I am the 
middle man on it. There is no way the bank is going to loan money . . . for somebody 
who['s] in jail." R. 287:49-50. 
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Third, the State did not ask the trial court to send Udy to prison because it "would 
be great if [$]20 million [commission] showed up" and the creditors could be paid back. 
R. 287:11, 45. But the State expressed skepticism that such a commission would ever 
come. R. 287:45. Udy was fired from his job as a securities agent and lost his license 
because he failed to disclose five promissory notes to the Division of Securities during an 
investigation. R. 287:42-43. Thereafter, the State filed the charges in this case because 
Udy "sold more securities after he was no longer licensed." R. 287:43. Then, nine days 
after entering the plea in abeyance, Udy borrowed more money in exchange for a promise 
of 20 percent interest. R. 287:43. His explanation at the evidentiary hearing was that he 
thought "it was okay" because he "didn't give [that creditor] a promissory note." R. 
287:43. "I don't think he gets it." R. 287:44. He has said "that the money's going to be 
here any day now for two or three years." R. 287:11-12. He "probably believes" the art 
project will be a success, but "I don't think that money's coming." R. 287:12, 44. "I 
hope as much as everyone else does here . . . that that $20 million is coming and they can 
get paid back. But he's been telling people . . . for a year that it's coming." R. 287:44. 
"I get the sense that he was under water, he was losing out, so he grasped at something 
that a friend brought him. Something that frankly doesn't make a whole lot of sense. 
$600 million for an art project out of California." R. 287:45. "I don't think they're going 
to [get paid back], and I hate saying that. But I don't see how he's ever going to come up 
with that kind of money." R. 287:46. 
Fourth, the creditors demonstrated by a show of hands that they were divided "half 
and half as to whether Udy should be incarcerated. R. 287:24. Half the victims 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
believed the court should not to incarcerate Udy because "he got in a pinch," but "he's 
doing all that he can" to pay us back, and we "would rather see him outside of jail 
working to get us our money." R. 287:15-16; see also R. 287:20-24, 25-29, 32-33, 39-42. 
The other half believed incarceration might be appropriate because Udy's excuses were 
"bogus"; he "got in over his head," and "he was just borrowing from Peter to pay Paul." 
R. 287:18-19, 30; see^lsoR. 287:16-17, 19-20, 29-31, 34-39. 
Throughout the sentencing hearing, the trial court expressed doubt that Udy would 
be able to pay back the creditors, as he claimed. R. 287:4-5, 25-27, 31-32, 53. Finally, 
the court asked Udy how long it would take to complete the art project and receive the 
expected commission. R. 287:50. Udy believed it would take "60 days at most." R. 
287:50. The trial court then said to defense counsel: "Sixty days at the most. All right. 
You want to go forward? I'm ready to sentence him." R. 287:51. Defense counsel 
responded, "Yes, Your Honor, we're ready to go forward." R. 287:51. The trial court 
then imposed sentence: 
Well, this is what I'm going to do. I'm going to give him 1 to 15 on the 
two second degree felonies; zero to 5 on the third; stay the imposition of 
that sentence. I'm going to make him do a year in jail. And then after the 
year in jail, he'll be on 36 months probation. But this is the deal. Right 
now it's May 3rd. We'll go to June, July and I'm going to cut you a little 
slack here,. . . we'll set a review on the 2nd of August—no, let's do it 
another time, I'll give you even some more time. Let's do the review on 
the 3rd of August, 8:30 in the morning. You have these people paid off 
because this money has come in in the 60 day time frame, I'll reconsider 
the jail sentence and I may cut it down. You'll do a little jail. You're 
going to be a little punitive aspect to it, but I'm willing to do that and some 
of those people have urged me to do that. And if you don't, you're going to 
do the year regardless. 
R. 287:51; see Addendum D. 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The parties and court then discussed the logistics of the restitution payments. R. 
287:52-54. As part of this discussion, the court said, "The check's got to clear. We're 
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The parties and court then discussed the logistics of the restitution payments. R. 
287:52-54. As part of this discussion, the court said, "The check's got to clear. We're 
going to be realistic here. But if that makes everybody feel good, and . . . we had a mixed 
group here, I think, but I'm going to give him that time frame and if the money's not 
there, he's at least going to go to jail, and he may go to prison." R. 287:53. 
On the same day as the sentencing hearing, the trial court issued a Sentence, 
Judgment, Commitment. R. 224-25. In the Judgment, as at the hearing, the trial court 
imposed and suspended prison terms of one to fifteen years and zero to five years, 
imposed and suspended a jail term of 365 days, and placed Udy on probation. R. 224-25. 
It also scheduled a review hearing for August 3, 2010, saying that "if the defendant pays 
off all victims, court will [re]consider jail sentence, if the victims are not paid off, 
defendant will serve the 365 days as ordered." R. 225. The trial court entered the 
Judgment into the record without a signature. R. 225. 
At the August 3, 2010, review hearing, defense counsel announced that Udy had 
not yet "been able to obtain the funds that he had hoped at the last sentencing hearing to 
be able to make substantial restitution payments." R. 288:1; see Addendum E. Defense 
counsel, however, encouraged the court not to impose the jail sentence yet because he 
had maintained "contact with a number of Mr. Udy's creditors" and they believe that if 
Udy "is taken into custody today,. . . it's very likely that [the art project] would fall 
through." R. 288:1-2. Additionally, "to bring the Court up to speed with respect to what 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
has been occurring" with the art project, Udy produced "a letter and an email."1 R. 
288:1. This exchange then occurred: 
The Court: Mr. Noakes, give me a break. I gave him a drop dead date and I 
let him tell me how long it would take. Did I not? 
Defense Counsel: You did, Your Honor. 
The Court: It's over. It's over. 
R. 288:2. At that point, defense counsel attempted to speak, saying, "You Honor—." R. 
288:2. But the trial court interrupted, saying: 
1
 The letter and email are included in the record. R. 230; 232. Both are dated August 2, 
2010. R. 230, 232. The letter is addressed to Udy from Andrew Mason, Lead Paymaster 
to the Bascom Art Trust. R. 230. It says: 
We wanted to update you on the funding progress of the Art Trust. 
All of the underwriting details have been completed by the Lending Bank 
and they have given us a distribution date of the August 23, 2010. Your 
dedicated efforts in working with the insurance company to secure Wrap 
Insurance has been key to what has been completed so far. Your continued 
involvement with Prudential Assurance is vital in ensuring the August 23, 
2010 distribution date. 
This has been a long road for all involved and we are excited that we 
can see the finish line as it will benefit all parties involved. 
R. 230. The email is addressed to Udy from Richard Smart, president of Against All 
Odds Investment Group, LLC. R. 232. It says: 
I wanted to give you the latest update on the art submission that is 
going into trade[.] 
When we go into trade, which includes the purchase of the insurance 
wrap/bond policy for $350,000,000.00 US, we will get an 80% LTV as 
previously discussed with a great return every month. 
Thank you for negotiating that for us in advance. That was 
instrumental in getting this deal done so quickly. 
We should be in trade by next Monday and then the first round of 
payments will be issued on 8/23/2010! 
Great news and thank you and Richard for your continued efforts. 
R.232. 
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No, no, no, it's over. I gave him an opportunity. I had all these fine people 
from Brigham Ch\ talk to me. Some thought he was the most wonderful 
•
M ;n the world ()itiers thought he was a con-man. And others had 
_ motions about the whole thing. And so because of that and because 
of these poor people that had been ripped off, I said oka>. Mr. Udy, when is 
this all going to come together, and when are you going to have your 
money available? And he gave me a lime frame and 1 ga\c him beyon 1 
what he asked. And now it's time | to| pas the piper, ! Jon't believe tin- i 
ji ist do not believe it. 
R. 288:2. 
' I 'he trial court then asked the State if it wanted to "express [its] opinion. R. 
288:2 I he State responded: 
Your i ioiiwi, i iijd llic letter, i nuu^cu u Has a stu - • • * nab a ^late, 
it has no cih . you know, clearly it's the letter with .;,.,:: .^aJ Uiat was just 
printed up. Frankly, to be honest with the Court, my feeling is that Mr 
{ k\\ is probably being ^cammed and he's taken some of this mone\, th^ 
i mone\ thai he's received from people, sent it on to this bigger fish 
s scumming him. That's just my instinctual feeling about ;t M t^ *fie 
•M- !»: ^  k k ibis nionev k not roming. 
R. 288:3. I he LUUI •: ' .i ' ' ^ "' 
defense counsel again altempwd lo speak. sa\ing, "Your Honor, I have a ." k. 288:3. 
But the trial coi irt interrupted again, saying: 
i\\ . ti-v A*. 1 v, H\M iLiikHiL. LK\ i v u i O i v i J i w u b i ^ C n u u t ; n , a i i u i ^<nu u ; l l 
nine. I've revisited this in my head and I feel so sorry for these peopk v MO 
have been ripped off I Ic*s going lo prison to be taken forthwith. 1 to i5, 
zero to 5 concurrent. All of the - monetarx obligation lo be sent to the 
board. 
R 288 3. 
After a brief discussion about the amount of restitution owed, defense coi msel 
asked for "clarification km the terms of Mr I'd} *s commitmenl " R, 2SX:4. "My 
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i 
understanding is that the prison was suspended that he was sentenced to one year in the 
Salt Lake County Jail." R. 288:4. The trial court responded: < 
No, I'm backing up on that. He wasn't—I initially said that I was going to 
give him a year in jail. I'm not. He lied to me. And if he lies to me, then 
he's going to pay the price. . . . I gave him an opportunity, Mr. Noakes, and 
it just isn't going to work. So he's going to prison. And I did sentence him j 
to prison, but I suspended it. Now he's going forthwith. 
R. 288:4. 
When defense counsel asked, "Would that be based on the feeling of the Court 
that he's lied today in the courtroom?" the court responded, "No, he lied to me back in 
May when I gave him the opportunity and he assured me that that money would be here
 ( 
so he could pay off those people. He deceived me. He lied to me. He doesn't get the 
benefit of the better sentence." R. 288:4. 
Defense counsel then stated that his understanding, based on "what the Court had 
previously indicated," "was simply that [the court] had given [Udy] additional time" to 
pay back the creditors, "and that if he" succeeded, "there would be a discount, but not 
that there would be additional—." R. 288:4-5. Defense counsel could not complete his 
statement, however, because the trial court interrupted again: 
No, no, no discount. I didn't say discount. I said to Mr. Udy, how long is it 
going to take you? Give me a time frame on this money that all this 
money's going to come in? Give me a time frame, and I'll give you the 
benefit of the doubt. Because of all of the people from Brigham City that 
really believed in him, although there were about half that didn't. And I 
gave him the opportunity and why should I make it better for him now 
because he lied to me, he wasn't telling the truth. You may believe it, I 
don't believe it. And I'm not going to put up with that. That is not right. 
He committed the offense. He admitted he committed the . . . offenses; [a] 
third degree felony and a second degree felony, and I was going to give him 
the benefit of the doubt but he did not produce and he lied to me. And I 
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think I have a right to pull the plug on that because of his conduct. If you 
think otherwise, take it up. But I think it's my right to pull the plug on him 
and say you don't deserve the benefit of the doubt, Mr. Udy, because you 
don't tell the truth. And he has an obligation to this Court to tell me the 
truth and he didn't. So he's going to prison. One to 15, zero to 5, 
concurrent. You disagree, let an appellate court tell me I shouldn't do it. 
R. 288:5. 
On the same day as the review hearing, the trial court issued a signed Sentence, 
Judgment, Commitment, sentencing Udy to serve concurrent terms of one to fifteen years 
and zero to five years in prison. R. 228-29. On August 23, 2010, the trial court issued 
this ruling: 
On May 3, 2010 Defendant was sentenced on the felony charges which 
were suspended and he was given a year in jail. During the course of the 
sentencing Judge Barrett was assured by the Defendant that he would have 
the victims repaid by a day certain and the court set a review for August 3, 
2010, which was after the time frame where the Defendant assured the 
judge the victims would be paid. On August 3, 2010 defense counsel 
advised the judge that nothing had been paid. The Judge stated that 
Defendant had misrepresented and lied to the court regarding his ability to 
obtain enough money to pay off all the creditors. Based upon this conduct 
the judge amended the sentence and sent the Defendant to prison rather 
than imposing the jail term ordered on May 3, 2010. 
R.231. 
On September 2, 2010, Udy filed for a Motion to Correct Sentence under rule 
22(e), asking the court to "honor its original sentence, as ordered on May 3, 2010, of 365 
days in the Salt Lake County Jail." R. 235-60. "The Sentencing held on May 3, 2010, 
was a complete sentencing under Rule 22." R. 239. That sentence "clearly describes the 
payment of restitution within the 90 days as an opportunity to earn a reduction in the total 
jail sentence." R. 240. "The Court made no statement Mr. Udy would have reasonably 
13 
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i 
understood as saying that non-payment would be equated as a lie. Had the Court 
informed Mr. Udy that more was at stake, i.e., that non-payment would result in un- ( 
suspension of the prison term, Mr. Udy would have approached the situation differently 
and may very well have asked to opt out—to simply begin his one year jail term right 
the[n]." R. 241. Udy, therefore, asked the court to correct its illegal sentence and "allow 
Mr. Udy to serve out his one-year jail term." R. 241. On September 2, Udy also filed a 
timely Notice of Appeal. R. 233-34. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
As part of his plea in abeyance, Udy admitted the facts stated in the Affidavit of \ 
Probable Cause. R. 126. Regarding the False Statements Unlawful charge, the affidavit 
says: "On December 11, 2002, Udy entered into a Stipulation and Consent Order with the 
i 
Utah Division of Securities regarding his issuance of unregistered securities. In the 
Stipulation, Udy represented that there were no promissory notes or unreported private 
securities transactions other than those disclosed in the Stipulation.55 R. 7. Thereafter, on j 
July 8, 2003, Udy5s employer, Park Avenue Securities, notified the Division that it found 
five additional promissory notes issued by Udy. R. 7-8. "By failing to disclose the 
existence of the[se] . . . promissory notes to the Division, Udy violated § 61-1-16 of the 
Utah Uniform Securities Act.55 R. 8. Thus, Udy admitted: 
[Commencing on or about December 2002, Udy willfully caused to be 
made, in any document filed with the Division of Securities, or in any 
proceeding, any statement which was, at that time and in the light of the 
circumstances under which it was made, false or misleading in any material 
respect, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §61-1-16 and § 61-1-21. 
R. 126. 
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Regarding the Securities Fraud charge, the affidavit says: Due to Udy's continued 
outside business activity and failure to disclose all of his promissory notes, Park Avenue 
Securities terminated his employment on July 2, 2003. R. 8. Thereafter, "[o]n October 9, 
2003, the Division revoked Udy's broker-dealer/agent license and barred him from 
employment with any licensed broker-dealer or investment adviser in the State of Utah." 
R. 8-9. After his license was revoked, Udy issued two promissory notes that qualified as 
securities: One to Tyler Garrett for $125,000, and one to Patricia Garrett for $325,000. 
R. 9. "In connection with the offer and sale of a security, Udy failed to disclose . . . 
material information to Patricia Garrett and her son, Tyler Garrett," including the 
Stipulation and Consent Order he entered with the Division and the revocation of his 
license to sell securities. R. 10-11. In sum: 
[Commencing on or about November 2003, in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, in connection with the offer or sale of a security, directly or 
indirectly, to Tyler Garrett, [he] made untrue statements of a material fact 
or [he] omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements [he] made, in the light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading; or, [he] engaged in an act, practice, or course of 
business which operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon this 
person, a violation of Utah Code Ann. §61-1-16 and §61-1-21, a second 
degree felony. 
R. 126. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
First, the amended Sentence, Judgment, Commitment violated the state and federal 
protections against double jeopardy. The state and federal double jeopardy clauses 
proscribe resentencing where the defendant has developed a legitimate expectation of 
finality in his original sentence. A legitimate expectation of finality is only undermined 
15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
if the original sentence was illegal, a clerical error was made, or the court specifically 
reserved the right to impose a harsher sentence pending future information. In this case, 
this Court should reverse because Udy had a legitimate expectation of finality in his 
original sentence. The original sentence was legal and was not altered by a clerical error. 
Moreover, the trial court did not expressly reserve the right to impose a harsher sentence 
at the August 3 review hearing, and nothing in the record indicates that Udy was or 
should have been aware that his sentence could later be increased or transformed to 
imprisonment. 
Second, the trial court violated Udy's right to allocution and due process when it 
prevented Udy and defense counsel from speaking at the August 3 review hearing. 
Compliance with the right to allocution requires the trial court to affirmatively afford the 
defendant and his counsel an opportunity to address the court and present information in 
mitigation of punishment. Additionally, compliance with due process requires the trial 
court to base the sentence on reasonably reliable and relevant information. In this case, 
the trial court denied Udy the right to allocution and due process because it did not 
affirmatively afford Udy the opportunity to speak, and it repeatedly interrupted and 
silenced defense counsel. Moreover, it accepted and agreed with unreliable and 
irrelevant information offered by the State without allowing defense counsel the 
opportunity to respond. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED DOUBLE JEOPARDY BY 
ENTERING AN INCREASED SENTENCE AFTER JUDGMENT 
HAD ALREADY BEEN IMPOSED AND UDY HAD GAINED A 
LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN ITS FINALITY 
After a trial court enters judgment and a defendant gains a legitimate expectation 
of finality in that judgment, any increase in the sentence violates the state and federal 
protections against double jeopardy. In this case, the trial court's order increasing the 
sentence after Udy had gained a legitimate expectation of finality in the original 
judgment violated the state and federal protections against double jeopardy. See infra at 
Part LA. Defense counsel's objection preserved this issue for review, but even if it did 
not, this Court can review the issue under rule 22(e). See infra at Part LB. 
A. The Trial Court's Order Increasing Sentence After Udy Gained a Legitimate 
Expectation of Finality in the Original Judgment Violated the State and 
Federal Protections Against Double Jeopardy. 
The protection against double jeopardy, found in article 1, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution, the Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution, applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, and Utah Code Ann. §77-1-
6(2)(a) (2008), protects individuals from multiple punishments for the same offense. 
U.S. Const, amend. V ("nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb"); Utah Const, art. I, § 12 ("nor shall any person be twice 
put in jeopardy for the same offense"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(2)(a) (2008) ("No 
person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense). 
17 
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"The primary purpose of the clause is to protect the finality of judgments." United 
States v. Fogel 829 F.2d 77, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. < 
82, 92 (1978); Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978)). "If there is anything settled in the 
jurisprudence of England and America, it is that no man can be twice lawfully punished 
i 
for the same offense. And . . . there has never been any doubt of [this rule's] entire and 
complete protection of the party when a second punishment is proposed in the same 
court, on the same facts, for the same statutory offense." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 
U.S. 711, 717-18 (1969) (omission and alterations in original), overruled on other 
grounds, Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989). "[T]he Constitution was designed as
 { 
much to prevent the criminal from being twice punished for the same offense as from 
being twice tried for it." Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 173 (1873). 
The double jeopardy provisions of the Utah and federal constitutions are similar in 
that they both "embod[y] three separate protections: (1) protection against a second 
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) protection against a second < 
prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) protection against multiple 
punishments for the same offense." State v. Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, {^36, 218 P.3d 610 
(citation omitted); see Harris, 2004 UT 103, ^ 24. "The prohibition against multiple 
punishments, which is the prohibition at issue in this case, itself includes two 
prohibitions: (1) against 'greater punishment than the legislature intended,' and (2) 
against sentence adjustments that upset a defendant's legitimate 'expectation of finality in 
his sentence.'" Warnick v. Booher, 425 F.3d 842, 847 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal and other
 ( 
citation omitted). 
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Additionally, Utah's state constitutional protections against double jeopardy 
provide greater protection than those afforded by the United States 
Constitution, cf. State v. Trafnv, 799 P.2d 704, 709-10 & n.18 (Utah 1990) 
(observing that federal double jeopardy protection is "instructive," but 
nevertheless conducting a separate analysis pursuant to the Utah 
Constitution); \State v.1 Ambrose, 598 P.2d [354,] 358-60 [(Utah 1979)] 
(articulating and applying a distinct double jeopardy standard under the 
Utah Constitution that was formulated before the federal double jeopardy 
clause was made applicable to the states). 
Harris, 2004 UT 103, Tf23. 
Because Utah's constitutional protection against double jeopardy is stronger than 
its federal counterpart, the Utah Supreme Court has chosen to address a double jeopardy 
claim within the context of article I, section 12 of the state constitution. See kL In any 
event, both the state constitution, with its powerful protection against double jeopardy, 
and the double jeopardy protection of the federal constitution, along with state statutory 
provisions, preclude increasing the sentence after a defendant has gained a legitimate 
expectation of finality in the original judgment. See, e.g., Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, [^36. 
In this case, therefore, the trial court violated the state and federal protections against 
double jeopardy when it imposed a harsher sentence after it had already imposed 
judgment because Udy had a legitimate expectation of finality in the original judgment. 
The state and federal double jeopardy clauses '""proscribe[] resentencing where 
the defendant has developed a legitimate expectation of finality in his original 
sentence.'"" Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, f36 (citations omitted). In other words, '"[i]f a 
defendant has a legitimate expectation of finality, then an increase in that sentence is 
prohibited.'" United States v. Husein, 478 F.3d 318, 338 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation 
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omitted). If, on the other hand, "there is some circumstance which undermines the 
legitimacy of that expectation, then a court may permissibly increase the sentence." < 
Fogel 829 F.2d at 87. 
Circumstances that undermine the legitimacy of an expectation of finality are 
i 
when a sentence is illegal, when a clerical error was made, or when the court specifically 
reserved the right to impose a harsher sentence pending future information. See, e.g., 
Pearce, 395 U.S. at 721-22 (defendant defeated the expectation of finality by appealing 
his conviction); Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 166-67 (1947) (defendant had no 
legitimate expectation of finality because sentence was unlawful); Hayes v. United 
States, 249 F.2d 516, 517-18 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ("[A] sentence which does not conform 
with the applicable statute [because it is below the statutory minimum] may be corrected 
i 
though defendant.. . has begun to serve it."), cert, denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958); United 
States v. Crawford, 769 F.2d 253, 257 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Defendant is charged with 
knowledge that his sentence, if illegally imposed, is subject to correction . . . [and] < 
[u]nder such circumstances . . . has no expectation of finality in the sentence he 
receives."); Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, Tf37 ("[T]he correction of a clerical error that amends 
i 
a criminal sentence . . . does not violate principles of double jeopardy when there is no 
legitimate expectation of finality in the sentence."); State v. Horrocks, 2001 UT App 4, 
«|23, 17 P.3d 1145 (rule "requiring a final signed order before jeopardy attaches . . . is 
proper in cases where the court has expressly declined to impose a final sentence until it 
has had the opportunity to review sentencing information"); State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86,
 { 
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88-89 (Utah 1991) (because an illegal sentence has no legal effect, correcting it to include 
an increased sentence does not violate the protection against double jeopardy). 
In sum, '"[a] defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence 
unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be 
increased'" Husein, 478 F.3d at 338 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original); see Fogel, 
829 F.2d at 87 (same). 
In Husein, for example, the defendant had a legitimate expectation in the finality 
of her sentence because "nothing in the record indicate[d] that [she] was aware at the 
time of sentencing that her sentence could 'permissibly be increased' or otherwise 
transformed from noncustodial to imprisonment." Husein, 478 F.3d at 339. In that case, 
the trial court granted defendant a downward departure in sentencing due to the need for 
defendant to care for her ailing father. Id. at 321-22. On appeal, the government argued 
that the downward departure should be reversed because "the death of [defendant's] 
father four months after sentencing," led to "a 'windfall'" for defendant because she got 
to "remain[] at home as opposed to being in prison." Id. at 338. Although the district 
court had warned defendant at sentencing that she "'could find [her]self back here or in 
front of some other Court and another Judge may not give you this break . . . that we 
granted today,'" "the court did not mention that a change in [defendant's] family 
circumstances, the relevant issue here, also might result in an increased sentence." Id. at 
339. "Nor should [defendant] have been so aware, except perhaps with respect to the 
ever-present but here-inapplicable possibility of a post-sentencing amendment designed 
to remedy a clerical error in the judgment." Id. (citation omitted). The trial court could 
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have delayed sentencing to see how events surrounding defendant's familial difficulties 
would unfold, but "the district court did not do so, and . . . the government, more < 
tellingly, never asked the court to do so." Id. "The essence of the problem . . . is the 
government's failure to ask the district court to fashion a sentence that would take into 
i 
account the likelihood that [defendant's] father would die in the immediate future. Its 
afterthought on appeal simply comes too late." Id at 340. 
Similarly, in Fogel, the defendant "had a legitimate expectation of finality in the 
severity of the sentence originally imposed by the district court" because the sentence 
was legal, defendant "had no reason to believe that the district court could . . . increase 
the length of his sentence," and defendant "proceeded to serve the sentence as if it were 
final." Fogel 829 F.2d at 88-89. In that case, the defendant was originally sentenced to 
< 
serve "twelve months of house arrest." Id at 79-80. Thereafter, the trial court: imposed a 
new sentence because it believed the original sentence was illegal. Id at 80. On appeal, 
the appellate court reversed, holding the sentence was not illegal and that the trial court's ( 
decision to impose a harsher sentence violated double jeopardy. Id at 88-90. "First, an 
increase in [defendant's] term of probation was not necessary to bring the sentence into 
compliance with any statute." Id. at 88. "Of course, the [defendant] was aware that he 
could receive a greater sentence upon revocation of probation, but this is irrelevant 
because the [defendant's] probation was not revoked." Id Second, the increase in the 
original sentence was: 
not predicated on any action taken by the [defendant]. The [defendant] did 
not appeal his conviction. Nor did he challenge the original sentence. To 
the contrary, the [defendant] proceeded to serve the sentence as if it were 
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final in all respects. [He] paid the fine in full, reported to a probation 
officer, and executed the terms and conditions of his probation [He] had no 
reason to believe that the district court could, on its own motion and 
without explanation, increase the length of his sentence. 
Id at 89. 
In this case, this Court should reverse because "nothing in the record indicates that 
[Udy] was [or should have been] aware at the time of sentencing that [his] sentence could 
'permissibly be increased' or otherwise transformed from noncustodial to imprisonment." 
Husein,478F.3dat339. 
At the beginning of the May 3 sentencing hearing, in compliance with rule 22(a) 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the trial court asked if there was any legal 
reason why he should not proceed with sentencing, and defense counsel responded that 
there was not. R. 287:3-4; see Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) ("Before imposing sentence the 
court shall afford the defendant an opportunity . . . to show any legal cause why sentence 
should not be imposed.5'). In compliance with section 77-18-1(6), the trial court then 
provided defense counsel an opportunity to raise any "inaccuracies in the presentence 
investigation report." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (Supp. 2010); see R. 287:3-4. 
In compliance with section 77-18-1(7) and rule 22(a), the trial court then received 
all "testimony, evidence, [and] information the defendant [and] the prosecuting attorney 
desire[d] to present concerning the appropriate sentence." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7) 
(Supp. 2010); see Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) ("Before imposing sentence the court shall 
afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in 
mitigation of punishment.. . . The prosecutor shall also be given an opportunity to 
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present any information material to the imposition of sentence.55). In particular, the trial 
court heard argument from defense counsel and the State, and heard statements by Udy ' 
and the creditors. R. 287:4-51. The trial court heard "[t]his testimony, evidence, [and] 
information . . . in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant.55 Utah Code 
Ann. §77-18-1(7); see 287:4-51. 
Together, the PSR, the parties5 arguments, and the statements by Udy and the 
creditors gave the trial court a comprehensive understanding of the evidence for and 
against incarceration. First, the trial court learned that Udy had not acted with the intent 
to victimize the creditors, had accepted responsibility for his illegal actions, felt
 { 
remorseful, was determined to pay back the victims, and had a strong family support 
system that would help him succeed. R. 174:2-4; 287:4, 6-8, 9-11, 46-49. Second, it 
i 
learned that Udy had a plan to pay back the creditors by earning a large commission on 
an art project and was working hard to achieve that commission. R. 287:7-9, 11-13. 
Third, it learned that the sentencing guidelines recommended Udy serve 19.2 months of < 
probation and that the PSR5s recommendation for imprisonment rested on the incorrect 
assumption that incarceration would "not affect55 Udy5s ability to earn the commission. 
R. 174:1, 4, 7-8; but see R. 287:49-50. Fourth, it learned that the creditors were evenly 
split as to whether Udy should be incarcerated or placed on probation. R. 287:15-42. 
Fifth, it learned that the State, though skeptical, was not seeking incarceration because of 
the possibility that Udy would, if placed on probation, earn the commission and pay back 
the creditors. R. 287:11-12, 44-46. , 
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Although the State and the trial court expressed skepticism about the art project 
commission, the trial court did not delay the sentencing until August to see whether the 
commission would arrive; and the State did not ask the court to institute such a delay. R. 
287; see Horrocks, 2001 UT App 4, TJ23 (rule "requiring a final signed order before 
jeopardy attaches . . . is proper in cases where the court has expressly declined to impose 
a final sentence until it has had the opportunity to review sentencing information. In that 
context, the requirement of a final signed order signals that the court has issued its final 
decision on sentencing and jeopardy attaches at that point to preclude further 
modification of the sentence."). 
Instead, the trial court announced that it was "ready to sentence [Udy]" and 
elicited defense counsel's assurance that Udy was "ready to go forward [with 
sentencing]." R. 287:51. The trial court then fashioned a sentence that took into account 
the information provided by the PSR, defense counsel, the prosecutor, Udy, and the 
creditors. R. 287:51. In particular, it took into account the State's and the court's own 
skepticism that the commission would ever materialize. R. 287:51. 
The trial court imposed and suspended prison terms of one to fifteen years and 
zero to five years and placed Udy on 36 months of probation. R. 287:51. In order to 
inject a "punitive aspect" into the sentence, the trial court imposed a jail term of 365 days 
in jail. R. 287:51. But, fashioning into the sentence its skepticism about whether Udy 
would be able to pay back the victims in sixty days as he claimed, the trial court 
suspended the jail term and scheduled a review hearing for August 3. R. 287:51. If Udy 
had "paid off the victims by the August 3 review hearing, the trial court announced that 
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it would "reconsider the jail sentence" and consider "cut[ting] it down." R. 287:51. If, 
on the other hand, Udy had not paid back the victims by the review hearing, he was j 
"going to do the year [in jail] regardless." R. 287:51. 
Thereafter, the trial court reduced the sentence to writing in the Sentence, 
Judgment, Commitment. R. 224-25. The written order mirrored the sentence imposed at 
the sentencing hearing, including the trial court's plan to "[re]consider jail sentence" at 
the August 3 review hearing "if the defendant pays off all victims," but to order Udy to 
"serve the 365 days as ordered" "if the victims are not paid off." R. 225. 
In keeping with the trial court's intent to reconsider and possibly reduce the jail
 ( 
sentence at the review hearing, the trial court did not sign the Sentence, Judgment, 
Commitment. R. 225. Instead, it entered the Judgment into the record unsigned, thereby 
allowing the trial court to maintain subject matter jurisdiction over the sentence until the 
review hearing. See State v. Grant, 2011 UT App 158, — P.3d — ( "entry of the 
judgment of conviction occurs when the signed judgment is entered into the record"); < 
Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, Tfl3 ("Once a court imposes a valid sentence and final judgment 
is entered, the court ordinarily loses subject matter jurisdiction over the case."); State v. 
Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah 1991) ("Once a [trial] court imposes a valid sentence 
[and final judgment is entered]," it has "no further subject matter jurisdiction to 
resentence [the defendant]."); Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(c) ("A judgment is complete and shall 
be deemed entered for all purposes . . . when it is signed and filed . . . ."). 
Although the trial court maintained subject matter jurisdiction over the sentence,
 ( 
however, it did not maintain the power to increase the sentence because Udy had a 
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legitimate expectation of finality in the original judgment. The sentence imposed at the 
sentencing hearing was legal and its meaning was not accidentally altered by a clerical 
error. Compare with Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, p 9 (defendant "had no legitimate 
expectation of finality in the original order of restitution" because a "clerical error" had 
caused "a misstatement of what was actually owed59). 
Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that Udy was or should have been aware 
at the time of sentencing that his sentence could permissibly be increased or transformed 
to imprisonment. See R. 287. The trial court did not "expressly decline[] to impose a 
final sentence until" the review hearing. Horrocks, 2001 UT App 4, {^23; see State v. 
Curry, 814 P.2d 1150, 1150 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (mem. decision) (trial court expressly 
declined to enter judgment until had opportunity to review PSR); State v. Wright, 904 
P.2d 1101, 1102 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (same). To the contrary, the sentence imposed at 
the sentencing hearing was clear and final: Udy would serve 36 months of probation and 
a year in jail, but the court would consider reducing the jail term if Udy had paid back the 
victims by the time of the review hearing. R. 224-25; 287; cf State v. Todd, 2006 UT 7, 
T[8 & n.2, 128 P.3d 1199 ("the date of the oral announcement of the sentence to the 
defendant is the date of imposition of sentence for all purposes"). 
Moments before the sentencing hearing ended, the trial court made an offhand 
remark that "if the money's not there, he's at least going to go to jail, and he may go to 
prison." R. 287:53. To the extent that this remark carried any weight at all, it did not 
eliminate Udy's legitimate expectation in the finality of the sentence. If the trial court 
wanted to rescind the sentence it had just imposed and delay sentencing until the August 
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3 review hearing, it had to "expressly decline[] to impose a final sentence until" the 
review hearing. Horrocks, 2001 UT App 4, ^23. Because the trial court made no express 
decision to rescind the sentence and delay sentencing, the trial court's offhand comment 
did not undermine Udy's legitimate expectation of finality in the sentence. See Husein, 
478 F.3d at 339 (defendant had legitimate expectation of finality where court warned her 
at sentencing that she "' could find [her]self back here . . . and another Judge may not give 
[her] this break . . . that we granted today,'55 but "did not mention that a change in [her] 
family circumstances . . . also might result in an increased sentence5'). Rather, the remark 
should be interpreted consistently with the sentence: Udy could receive a reduced jail 
term if he paid back the creditors by the review hearing; otherwise, he would serve the 
full year in jail and could be sent to prison if he violated his probation. 
At the close of the sentencing hearing, therefore, Udy held a legitimate expectation 
in the finality of the sentence and, thereafter, acted upon that legitimate expectation. 
Between the sentencing hearing and the review hearing, he worked hard to complete the 
art project. R. 288:1-2; see Fogel 829 F.2d at 91 n.9 ("The appellant clearly had begun 
serving his sentence at the time of the second sentencing hearing because prior to that 
hearing he had paid the fine, reported to a probation officer, and executed the terms of his 
probation." (citation omitted)); United States v. Jones, 722 F.2d 632, 635-36 (11th Cir. 
1983) (defendant had begun to serve sentence when he reported to probation officer and 
followed conditions set out by district court). 
When he was unable to complete the art project by the review hearing, Udy had no 
fear that he could lose his probationary status because the sentence did not make paying 
28 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
full restitution by August 3 a term of probation. R. 241; see Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
l(12)(a)(ii) ("Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding 
that the conditions of probation have been violated."). Rather, he legitimately understood 
that he would remain on probation, but would serve a year in jail. R. 241. 
When he appeared in court, therefore, he brought documentation to show that he 
had made a good faith effort to complete the art project on time, but that it would not be 
finished until August 23, 2010. R. 230; 232. With this documentation, he hoped to 
convince the court to delay the imposition of the jail term until August 23 in order to 
allow him the time necessary to obtain the commission and pay back the victims. R. 
288:1-2. He understood the court's sentence, however, and was prepared to go to jail that 
day and begin serving the 365 day term the court had imposed. R. 241; 288:1-2. The 
trial court's decision at the review hearing to increase the sentence came as a complete 
surprise to Udy and his counsel, R. 240-41; and impermissibly deprived Udy of his 
legitimate expectation in the finality of his sentence. 
B. This Court Can Review Udy's Double Jeopardy Claim. 
Defense counsel preserved Udy's Double Jeopardy claim by filing a Motion to 
Correct Sentence under rule 22(e). R. 235-60. In that motion, defense counsel declared 
the August 3 judgment illegal, explained that Udy had understood the original judgment 
was final and had relied upon that reasonable understanding, and asked the court to 
"honor its original sentence." R. 239-41. This argument followed the traditional double 
jeopardy analysis and was sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal because the issue 
was "'"submitted to the trial court, and the court [was] afforded an opportunity to rule on 
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the issue.'"" Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 129 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(citations omitted). In other words, the purpose of the preservation rule was met because 
the trial court was "given an opportunity to address a claimed error and . . . correct it," 
and Udy did not "forego making an objection with the strategy of enhance[ing] [his] 
chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fail[ed],. . . claiming] on appeal that the 
Court should reverse." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^[11, 10 P.3d 346 (quotations and 
citations omitted) (alterations in original). 
Besides, even if defense counsel's objection did not preserve the double jeopardy 
argument, this Court can reach the issue under rule 22(e). Rule 22(e) says "[t]he court 
2
 To the extent that the failure to use the phrase "double jeopardy" in the motion 
undermined his effort to preserve the issue for appeal, defense counsel provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, '"a 
defendant must show (1) that counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient performance 
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.'" 
State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, {^23, 84 P.3d 1183 (citations omitted). 
"To prevail on the first prong of the test, a defendant 'must identify specific acts or 
omissions demonstrating that counsel's representation failed to meet an objective 
standard of reasonableness.'" Montoya, 2004 UT 5, |^24 (citations omitted). Courts "will 
not second-guess trial counsel's legitimate strategic choices." State v. Tennyson, 850 
P.2d 461, 465 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citation omitted). A strategic choice is not 
legitimate, however, if defense counsel fails to "'adequately investigate'" the law 
relevant to that choice. State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, ^ 69, 152 P.3d 321 (citations 
omitted). To prevail on the second prong, a defendant must show "a reasonable 
likelihood that absent the error, the verdict would have been more favorable to 
defendant." State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citation omitted). 
In this case, defense counsel made a strategic decision to move the court to correct 
its sentence. As demonstrated above, this decision was proper because the sentence 
violated the double jeopardy provisions of the Utah and federal constitutions. See supra 
at Part LA. Defense counsel, however, did not research the law sufficiently to identify 
the specific constitutional provision violated. R. 235-60. Instead, he generally identified 
the sentence as illegal and asked the court to fix the sentence pursuant to rule 22(e). R. 
235-60. But for this failure, the issue would have been properly preserved on appeal and 
would have warranted reversal. 
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may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). "Rule 22(e) applies to sentences that are manifestly or patently 
illegal." Candedo, 2010 UT 32, T|9. "The 'sweeping' language of rule 22(e) allows an 
appellate court to 'vacate the illegal sentence without first remanding the case to the trial 
court, even if the matter was never raised before.'" Id. "The preservation rule does not 
apply 'because an illegal sentence is void and, like issues of jurisdiction, [may be raised] 
at any time." Id. (citation omitted) (alteration in original). 
"[T]he definition of illegal sentence under rule 22(e) is sufficiently broad to 
include constitutional violations that threaten the validity of the sentence." Candedo, 
2010 UT 32,1J14; see Telford, 2002 UT 51, ffi[3-4, 6 (reaching defendant's separation of 
powers and Eighth Amendment challenges to his sentence under rule 22(e)). In this case, 
Udy has raised a constitutional challenge that threatens the legality of his sentence; if he 
succeeds on appeal, the increased sentence must be vacated because it was imposed in 
violation of double jeopardy and the original sentence must be imposed. See supra at 
Part LA. Thus, Udy's double jeopardy challenge warrants review under rule 22(e). 
Hence, even if defense counsel did not preserve this issue for review, this court is 
able to review the double jeopardy claim. In fact, a sentence imposed in violation of 
double jeopardy is not only an illegal sentence, but it is also a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner since a court without authority to do so imposed a sentence in violation of 
constitutional protections. The double jeopardy violation in increasing Udy's sentence 
after Udy gained a legitimate expectation of finality in the judgment, therefore, should be 
addressed under rule 22(e) and vacated. 
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II. IMPOSING AN INCREASED SENTENCE WITHOUT ALLOWING 
UDY OR HIS COUNSEL TO SPEAK TO THE COURT OR PRESENT 
RELIABLE EVIDENCE AND BASING THE INCREASED SENTENCE 
ON UNREIABLE AND IRRELEVANT INFORMATION VIOLATED 
UDY'S RIGHT TO ALLOCUTION AND TO DUE PROCESS 
Although the trial court's violation of the protection against double jeopardy 
should require vacation of the August 3 judgment, the violation of the rights to allocution 
and due process at the August 3 review hearing also require that the increased sentence 
be vacated. These significant constitutional and statutory violations can be reached 
through the plain error doctrine or rule 22(e). 
A. The Violation of Udy's Right to Allocution and Due Process Requires that the 
Amended Sentence, Judgment Commitment be Vacated and the Original 
Sentence, Judgment Commitment be Imposed. 
"Rule 22(a) codifies the common-law right of allocution, allowing a defendant to 
make a statement in mitigation or explanation after conviction but before sentencing." 
State v. Wanosik, 2003 UT 46,1J18, 79 P.3d 937 (citation omitted). It says that "[b]efore 
imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a 
statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any 
legal cause why sentence should not be imposed." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). Section 77-
18-1 reiterates the right of allocution, dictating: "At the time of sentence, the court shall 
receive any testimony, evidence, or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney 
desires to present concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or 
information shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the 
defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7) (Supp. 2010). 
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Compliance with the right to allocution requires the trial court to provide "the 
defendant personally with an opportunity to address the court." Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, 
1fl[l9, 23. "[T]here are times, such as allocution, where the voice of the individual 
defendant is most appropriate in the presentation of a personal plea." Id at |^18 (citing 
State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 354-55 (Utah 1993) ("The most persuasive counsel may 
not be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak 
for himself.")). Compliance also "requires that defense counsel be given an opportunity 
to make a statement and present any information in mitigation of punishment." Wanosik, 
2003 UT 46,1fl[19, 23 (citation omitted). "Often the specific arguments of defense 
counsel are critical in ensuring the court is presented with such information and with 
some context in which to consider it." Id at [^19. 
The right to allocution "is an inseparable part of the right to be present." Id. at 
TJ20; see Utah Const, art. I, §12 ("In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right 
to appear and defend in person and by counsel."); Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(l)(a) (2008) 
("In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled . . . [t]o appear in person and defend 
in person or by counsel."); State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ^ [33 n. 7, 48 P.3d 853 (federal 
right to presence "is rooted in the Confrontation Clause, [and] further protected by the 
Due Process Clause in some situations where the defendant is not actually confronting 
witnesses or evidence" (citation omitted)). "[Defendants have the right to be present at 
all stages of the criminal proceedings against them," including sentencing. Wanosik, 
2003 UT 46,^12. 
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Additionally, the right to allocution safeguards due process by "ensuring] that the 
judge is provided with reasonably reliable and relevant information regarding 
sentencing." Id at Tfl9 (citing State v. Howell 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985) ("The due 
process clause of Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, requires that a sentencing 
judge act on reasonably reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in 
fixing a sentence.")). 
In sum, the right to allocution requires trial courts at the time of sentencing "to 
affirmatively provide the defense"—meaning the defendant and his attorney—"an 
opportunity to address the court and present reasonably reliable and relevant information 
in the mitigation of a sentence. A simple verbal invitation or question will suffice, but it 
is the court which is responsible for raising the matter." Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, ^[23; see 
United States v. Byars, 290 F.2d 515, 517 (6th Cir. 1961) ("The defendant, himself, must 
be given such opportunity and some conduct of the court must let the defendant know 
that he, as well as counsel, has this right."). 
Furthermore, just as the trial court must "affirmatively afford[]" the defendant and 
his attorney "an opportunity to make a statement, present any information in mitigation of 
punishment, or show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed," the trial court 
bears "the same affirmative obligation . . . vis-a-vis the prosecution." Wanosik, 2003 UT 
46,1J23. As stated in rule 22(a): "The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an 
opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of sentence." Utah R. 
Crim. P. 22(a); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7) (Supp. 2010). 
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In this case, the trial court conducted a proper sentencing hearing on May 3. In 
compliance with rule 22(a), the trial court asked if there was any legal reason why he 
should not proceed with sentencing, and defense counsel responded that there was not. 
R. 287:3-4. In compliance with section 77-18-1(6), the trial court then provided defense 
counsel an opportunity to raise any "inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (Supp. 2010); see R. 287:3-4. 
Further, in compliance with section 77-18-1(7) and rule 22(a), the trial court 
received all "testimony, evidence, [and] information the defendant [and] the prosecuting 
attorney desire[d] to present concerning the appropriate sentence." Utah Code Ann. § 77-
18-1(7) (Supp. 2010); see Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). In particular, the trial court heard 
argument from defense counsel and the State and heard statements by Udy and the 
victims. R. 287:4-51. The trial court heard "[t]his testimony, evidence, [and] 
information . . . in open court on record," "in the presence of the defendant," and "[a]t the 
time of sentence." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7); see 287:4-51. 
Because the trial court conducted a full sentencing hearing in compliance with the 
right to allocution, it had before it at the time it imposed sentence all the reasonably 
reliable and relevant information the parties wished the present. R. 287. This reasonably 
reliable and relevant information gave the trial court a comprehensive understanding of 
the defendant, the offense, including its aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the 
feelings of the victims, and the thoughts of the attorneys. R. 287:4-51. The trial court 
then took all this information into account and imposed a proper sentence. R. 287:51; see 
R. 287:4-5,25-27, 31-32, 53. 
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Whereas, the sentence imposed at the August 3 review hearing violated the right to 
allocution, as delineated in rule 22(a), section 77-18-1(6) and (7), and due process. At 
that hearing, the court did not ask if there was any legal reason why he should not impose 
sentence, as required by rule 22(a); and did not give defense counsel an opportunity to 
raise any inaccuracies in the PSR, as required by section 77-18-1(6). R. 288. 
Further, the trial court repeatedly interrupted defense counsel when he attempted 
to speak and denied defense counsel the "opportunity to address the court and present 
reasonably reliable and relevant information in the mitigation of a sentence." Wanosik, 
2003 UT 46, ^|23; see R. 288:2-3. It is evident from the record that defense counsel 
wished in particular to present information regarding the art project and why Udy had not 
received the anticipated commission yet. R, 288:1. Although he managed to get "a letter 
and an email" about the art project into the record, R. 230, 232, the trial court did not 
review those documents before imposing sentence. R. 288. Instead, the judge told 
defense counsel to "give me a break," and, thereafter, interrupted defense counsel every 
time he attempted to speak on Udy's behalf. R. 288:2-3. 
Additionally, the trial court did not "affirmatively afford[]" Udy the "opportunity 
to make a statement, present any information in mitigation of punishment, or show any 
legal cause why sentence should not be imposed." Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, ^[23; see R. 
288. Thus, although sentencing is a time when "the voice of the individual defendant is 
most appropriate in the presentation of a personal plea," Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, ^18 
(citation omitted), Udy did not get to speak on his own behalf. R. 288. 
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The only party that the trial court allowed to speak freely was the prosecutor. R. 
288:2. The prosecutor's statement, however, did not contain reasonably reliable or 
relevant information. R. 288:3. To the contrary, the State's statement was constructed of 
speculation. R. 288:3. The prosecutor said that she had read the letter provided by 
defense counsel and, because the address on the letterhead did not contain a city, she 
believed the letter was fake and "was just printed up." R. 288:3. She said that her 
"instinctual feeling" was that Udy "is probably being scammed and he's taken some of.. 
. this latest money that he's received from people, sent it on to this bigger fish that's 
scamming him." R. 288:3. 
Without giving defense counsel or Udy the opportunity to respond, the trial court 
agreed with the State's speculative argument. R. 288:3. By so doing, the trial court 
further violated Udy's right to due process because its sentence was based not only on 
incomplete information but on unreliable and irrelevant information. See State v. 
Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, [^34, 31 P.3d 615 (trial court does not have discretion to 
violate defendant's due process "right to be sentenced based on relevant and reliable 
information regarding his crime, his background, and the interests of society"), aff d, 
Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, ^19 ("one purpose of the right to allocute . . . is to ensure that the 
judge is provided with reasonably reliable and relevant information regarding 
sentencing"); State v. Sweat, 722 P.2d 746, 746 (Utah 1986) ("so long as basic 
constitutional safeguards of due process and procedural fairness are afforded, the trial 
court has broad discretion in considering 'any and all information that reasonably may 
bear on the proper sentence'" (citation omitted)); State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1248 
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(Utah 1980) ("fundamental fairness" requires that sentence be based only upon "accurate 
information"); State v. Sibert 310 P.2d 388, 393 (Utah 1957) (court abuses its discretion 
if it bases sentence upon "wholly irrelevant, improper or inconsequential consideration"). 
Then, when defense counsel attempted to respond, the trial court again interrupted 
and told counsel, "We're not talking anymore." R. 288:3. Thereafter, the trial court 
immediately imposed the new, increased sentence: "I said jail time. I've revisited this in 
my head and I feel so sorry for these people who have been ripped off. He's going to 
prison to be taken forthwith, 1 to 15, zero to 5 concurrent." R. 288:3. 
In conclusion, because the trial court violated Udy's right to allocution and to due
 { 
process at the August 3 review hearing, the August 3 sentencing order should be vacated 
and the original May 3 sentencing order should be imposed. 
i 
B. This Court Can Review This Issue on Appeal. 
The issue is preserved by defense counsel's repeated attempts to speak at the 
August 3 review hearing. R. 288:1-5. Defense counsel's repeated attempts to speak were < 
sufficient to preserve for appeal the violation of Udy's right to allocution and to due 
process because they "put[] the trial judge on notice of the asserted error and allow[ed] 
for correction at that time in the course of the proceeding.'" State v. Workman, 2006 UT 
App 116, Tfl5 n.2, 133 P.3d 453. Moreover, they demonstrate that Udy did not attempt to 
"forego making an objection with the strategy of enhance[ing] [his] chances of acquittal 
and then, if that strategy fail[ed],. . . claiming] on appeal that the Court should reverse." 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, [^11 (quotations and citations omitted) (alterations in original). , 
Rather, Udy did not speak because the trial court did not affirmatively afford him the 
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opportunity to speak, and defense counsel tried to speak but could not because the trial 
court continuously interrupted and silenced him. 
Besides, this Court can review the issue under plain error or rule 22(e). First, the 
Court can address the issue under the plain error doctrine. The Court will reverse for 
plain error where ""'(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the 
trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful.55"5 Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ^ 6 (citations 
omitted). In this case, defense counsel repeatedly attempted to speak at the August 3 
review hearing. R. 288. The trial court, however, repeatedly silenced defense counsel 
and did not "affirmatively afford[]55 Udy the "opportunity to make a statement, present 
any information in mitigation of punishment, or show any legal cause why sentence 
should not be imposed.55 Wanosik, 2003 UT 46 at f23; see R. 288. 
The trial court's behavior was erroneous, as explained in Part II.A. Moreover, the 
error was obvious because Udy5s right to allocution and the court's duty to affirmatively 
afford Udy and his counsel the right to speak at sentencing was well settled at the time of 
the review hearing. See, e.g., Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a); Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7) 
(Supp. 2010); Wanosik, 2003 UT 46. Likewise, Udy5s right to due process, including his 
right to be sentenced based on reasonably reliable and relevant information, was well 
settled at the time of the review hearing. See, e.g., Wanosik, 2003 UT 46; Wanosik, 2001 
UT App 241; Sweat, 722 P.2d 746; Lipskv, 608 P.2d 1241; Sibert,310 P.2d 388. 
Finally, the error was prejudicial. When the trial court held a proper sentencing 
hearing in which the rights to allocution and due process were protected, the trial court 
imposed a sentence that included 36 months of probation and up to 365 days in jail with 
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the possibility that the jail time would be reduced if restitution was paid in full by August 
3. R. 287. When the trial court violated Udy's right to allocution and due process and 
sentenced Udy based on incomplete information and speculation, the trial court imposed 
a much more severe sentence, declining probation and sending Udy to prison for 
concurrent terms of one to fifteen years and zero to five years. R. 228-29; 288:3. But for 
the trial court's violation of Udy's rights to allocution and due process, therefore, there is 
a "'reasonable probability that the outcome of the [sentencing] would have been 
different.'" Montoya, 2004 UT 5, |^23 (citations omitted). 
Second, this Court can address the issue under rule 22(e). A sentence imposed in 
violation of the right to allocution, as delineated in rule 22(a) and section 77-18-1(6), and 
the right to due process is an illegal sentence that can be reviewed under rule 22(e). See 
Candedo, 2010 UT 32, f 14; Telford, 2002 UT 51, ^[3-4, 6; supra at Part II.A. Further, a 
sentence that is imposed without the opportunity for allocution and in violation of due 
process is a sentence imposed in an illegal manner. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). In this 
case, therefore, where the trial court imposed sentence without granting Udy the right to 
allocution and based on unreliable and irrelevant information, this Court should vacate 
the sentence under rule 22(e) and impose the original May 3 sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant/Defendant Ronald Dean Udy respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
the amended Sentence, Judgment, Commitment dated August 3, 2010, and impose the 
original Sentence, Judgment, Commitment dated May 3, 2010. 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 




SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 051909160 FS 
Judge: WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Date: May 3, 2010 
PRESENT 
Clerk: cheril 
Prosecutor: BARLOW, CHARLENE 
Defendant . . . 
Defendant's Attorney(s): NOAKES/ CHAD D 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: May 15, 1939 
Video 
Tape Number: DVR W3 9 Tape Count: 2:36 
CHARGES 
1. .FALSE STATEMENTS ON SECURITIES DOCUMENT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 01/25/2010 Guilty 
2. SECURITIES FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 01/25/2010 Guilty 
3. SECURITIES FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition:" 01/25/2010 Guilty 
HEARING 
TAPE: DVR W3 9 COUNT: 2:36 
Parties have reached a stipulation. 
Defense will admit all note holders are victims and the State will 
not persue any further prosecution for those victims. 
Based on this stipulation, defense counsel withdraws his Motion to 
Exclude Victim Impact Statements. 
Order of Restitution will be left open. 
Defense counsel is ready to proceed with Sentencing 
Victims address the court 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of FALSE STATEMENTS ON 
SECURITIES DOCUMENT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced 
to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. > 
Page 1 
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CaseNo: 051909160 Date: May 03, 2010 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of FALSE STATEMENTS ON 
SECURITIES DOCUMENT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced 
to a term of 365 day(s) The total time suspended for this chcirge 
is 3 65 day(s). 
Court sets Review Hearing on 8-3-2010 @ 8:30, if the defendant pays 
off all victims, court will conconsider jail sentence, .if the 
victims are not paid off, defendant will serve the 365 days as 
ordered. Defendant is to provide a Cashiers Check to the 
State for release of funds to the victims. 
REVIEW HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 08/03/2010 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - W3 9 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
4 50 SOUTH STATE 
, SLC, UT 84114-1860 • 
Before Judge: WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Individuals needing special accommodations (including auxiliary 
communicative aids and services) should call Third District 
Court-Salt Lake at (801)238-7500 three days prior to the hearing. 
For TTY service call Utah Relay at 800-346-4128. The general 
information phone number is (801)238-7300. 
Page 2 (last) 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RONALD DEAN UDY, 
Defendant, 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 051909160 FS 
Judge: * WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Date: August 3, 2010 
PRESENT 
Clerk: cheril 
Prosecutor: BARLOW, CHARLENE 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): REBECCA HYDE SKORDAS 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: May 15, 1939 
Video 
Tape-Number: ' >'- W39., Tape Count: 8:51-8:58 
CHARGES ' * 
1. FALSE STATEMENTS ON SECURITIES DOCUMENT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty' - Disposition: 01/25/2010 Guilty 
2. SECURITIES FRAUD -.2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 01/25/2010 Guilty 
-SENTENCE PRISON 
Based"on-the defendant's conviction of FALSE STATEMENTS ON 
SECURITIES'DOCUMENT a 3rd-Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced 
fcb; an indeterminate; term^  of' not to exceed five years in the* Utah 
State '~P*rison..... ' ''"'/. % \* 
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Commitments are to run concurrent. 
The total time suspended for this charge -is. 
Page 1 
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Q o 
Case No: 051909160 Date: Aug 03, 2010 
All fines/restitution will be sent to t#e ^ o^rd of Par 
Date: #3> te&u-. WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
District Court Judge 
•Aii\--?\ 
, * . * , . ,.<., ^ * t „ 
..v 
• ; - ' „ , f - ' : * ' - ; •; 
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UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 77-1-6 (2008) 
§ 77-1-6. Rights of defendant 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district where the offense is 
alleged to have been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be entitled to a trial 
within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail and if the business of the court 
permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees 
to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of 
those rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a husband against his 
wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no 
contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by jury has been waived or, in case of an 
infraction, upon a judgment by a magistrate. 
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177 THE JUDGMENT 77-18-1 
(Q) This section does not require the admission of evidence not otherwise 
admissible. 
(7) Expenses of examination ordered by the court under this section shall be 
paid by the Department of Human Services, Travel expenses associated with 
the examination incurred by the defendant shall be charged by the department 
to the county where prosecution is commenced. Examination of defendants 
charged with violation of municipal or county ordinances shall be charged by 
the department to the entity commencing the prosecution. 
History: C. 1953, 77-16a-301, enacted by merit, effective May 12, 2009, substituted "Sub-
L. 1992, ch. 171, § 10; 1999, ch. 2, § 6; 2009, section 76-5-205.5(l)(a)" for "Section 76-5-
ch. 206, § 6. 205.5" in (l)(a) and made stylistic changes. 




77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Pleas mination, revocation, modifi-
held in abeyance — Probation cation, or extension — Hear-
— Supervision — Presen- ings — Electronic monitoring, 
tence investigation — Stan- 77-18-1.1. Screening, assessment, and 
dards — Confidentiality — treatment. 
Terms and conditions — Ter- 77-18-9 to 77-18-17. Renumbered/Repealed. 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance 
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence in-
vestigation — Standards — Confidentiality — 
Terms and conditions — Termination, revoca-
tion, modification, or extension — Hearings — 
Electronic monitoring. 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction 
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as 
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the 
plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction 
of any crime or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend 
the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The 
court may place the defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Cor-
rections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a 
private organization; or 
(hi) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing 
court, 
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the 
department is with the department. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of 
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. 
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence inves-
tigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. The|e 
standards shall be based on: 
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(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what 
level of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submit-
ted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an 
annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures 
to implement the supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider 
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and 
other criteria as they consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an 
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations 
subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required 
to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors 
or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C 
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the 
probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards. 
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of 
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a 
presentence investigation report from the department or information from 
other sources about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact 
statement according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the 
effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's family. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific state-
ment of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the 
department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the 
defendant in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims 
Restitution Act. 
(d) The presentence investigation report shall include: 
(i) findings from any screening and any assessment of the offender 
conducted under Section 77-18-1.1; and 
(ii) recommendations for treatment of the offender. 
(e) The contents of the presentence investigation report are protected 
and are not available except by court order for purposes of sentencing as 
provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the department. 
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report 
to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, 
the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to 
sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation 
report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department 
prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing 
judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve 
the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten 
working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall m^.ke a 
determination of relevance and accuracy on the record. 
(h^ Tf a npirtv fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence inves-
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tigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered 
to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, 
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present 
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information 
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may 
require that the defendant: 
(a) perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
placed on probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense 
Costs; 
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support the defen-
dant is legally liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs, including any 
treatment program in which the defendant is currently participating, 
if the program is acceptable to the court; 
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail 
designated by the department, after considering any recommendation 
by the court as to which jail the court finds most appropriate; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use 
of electronic monitoring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, in-
cluding the compensatory service program provided in Section 76-6-
107.1; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment 
services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with 
interest in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims 
Restitution Act; and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers 
appropriate; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school gradu-
ation diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the 
defendant's own expense if the defendant has not received the 
diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being 
placed on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items 
listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as 
defined by Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under 
Section 64-13-21 during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance 
with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised 
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accord 
dance with Subsection (10). 
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(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the 
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in 
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B 
or C misdemeanors or infractions, 
(ii) (A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period 
under Subsection (10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance 
upon the account receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the 
court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defen-
dant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the 
payment of the account receivable. 
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record 
in the registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already 
recorded and immediately transfer responsibility to collect the 
account to the Office of State Debt Collection, 
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, 
victim, or upon its own motion, the court may require the defendant to 
show cause why the defendant's failure to pay should not be treated as 
contempt of court, 
(b) (i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of 
State Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in 
advance in all cases when termination of supervised probation will 
occur by law. 
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and 
complete report of details on outstanding accounts receivable. 
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after 
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing 
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total 
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to 
revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision 
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time 
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated 
at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a 
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and 
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or 
warrant by the court. 
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver 
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in 
court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court 
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts 
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the 
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit 
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or 
extension of probation is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to 
be served on the defendant a warrant for the defendant's arrest or a 
copy of the affidavit and an order to show cause why the defendant's 
probation should not be revoked, modified, or extended. * 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place *for the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior 
to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(hi) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right 
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel 
appointed if the defendant is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present 
evidence. 
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations 
of the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(hi) The persons who have given adverse information on which the 
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to 
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause other-
wise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in the 
defendant's own behalf, and present evidence. 
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of 
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, 
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the 
sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of 
the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah 
State Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the 
superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or the superintendent's designee 
has certified to the court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at 
the state hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving 
priority for treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection 
(13). 
(14) Presentence investigation reports are classified protected in accordance 
with Title 63G, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and Management Act. 
Notwithstanding Sections 63G-2-403 and 63G-2-404, the State Records Com-
mittee may not order the disclosure of a presentence investigation report. 
Except for disclosure at the time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the 
department may disclose the presentence investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63G-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by 
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of 
the offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or 
the subject's authorized representative; or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence 
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided 
that the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to 
statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of thq 
crime including statements by the defendant*, or to the impact of the crime 
on the victim or the victim's household. Digitized by t e Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(15) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of 
probation under the supervision of the department, except as provided in 
Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home 
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred 
to the department in accordance with Subsection (16). 
(16) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it 
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the 
use of electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order 
of the court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the 
appropriate law enforcement, unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions 
which require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all 
times; and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the 
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement 
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this 
section, it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the 
Department of Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device 
on the defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the 
residence of the defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home 
confinement to the department or the program provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through 
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to 
be indigent by the court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in 
this section either directly or by contract with a private provider. 
History: C. 1953, 77-18-1, enacted by L. 2001, ch. 137, § 1; 2002, ch. 35, § 7; 2002 (5th 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, ch. 59, § 2; 1982, ch. S.S.), ch. 8, § 137; 2003, ch. 290, § 3; 2005 
9, § 1; 1983, ch. 47, § 1; 1983, ch. 68, § 1; (1st S.S.), ch. 14, § 3; 2007, ch. 218, § 3; 2008, 
1983, ch. 85, § 2; 1984, ch. 20, § 1; 1985, ch. ch. 3, § 252; 2008, ch. 382, § 2193; 2009, ch. 
212, § 17; 1985, ch. 229, § 1; 1987, ch. 114, 81, § 3. 
§ 1; 1989, ch. 226, § 1; 1990, ch. 134, § 2; Amendment Notes. — The 2009 amend-
1991, ch. 66, § 5; 1991, ch. 206, § 6; 1992, ch. ment, effective May 12, 2009, deleted "includ-
14, § 3; 1993, ch. 82, § 7; 1993, ch. 220, § 3; ing any diagnostic evaluation report ordered by 
1994, ch. 13, § 24; 1994, ch. 198, § 1; 1994, the court under Section 76-3-404" following 
ch. 230, § 1; 1995, ch. 20, § 146; 1995, ch. "investigation report" in (5)(e); deleted "includ-
117, § 2; 1995, ch. 184, § 1; 1995, ch. 301, § 3; ing presentence diagnostic evaluations" follow-
1995, ch. 337, § 11; 1995, ch. 352, § 6; 1996, ing "investigation reports" in the first sentence 
ch. 79, § 103; 1997, ch. 392, § 2; 1998, ch. 94, of the introductory language of (14); and made 
§ 10; 1999, ch. 279, § 8; 1999, ch. 287, § 7; a stylistic change. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Revocation of probation. crimes defendant committed while on proba-
tion, judge had jurisdiction to execute'bnly the 
—Reinstatement of sentence. previously imposed sentence of zero to five 
After revoking defendant's probation for years; he was not authorized to make the ear-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 22 
RULE 22. SENTENCE, JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall set a 
time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor more than 45 days after the 
verdict or plea, unless the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. 
Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or 
recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a 
statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal 
cause why sentence should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an 
opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant 
may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for sen-
tence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be issued by the court. 
(c)(1) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall impose sentence 
and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include the plea or the verdict, if any, 
and the sentence. Following imposition of sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of 
defendant's right to appeal and the time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(c)(2) If the defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, as de-
fined in Utah Code Section 77-36-1, the court shall advise the defendant orally or in 
writing that, as a result of the conviction, it is unlawful for the defendant to possess, receive 
or transport any firearm or ammunition. The failure to advise does not render the plea in-
valid or form the basis for withdrawal of the plea 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its commitment setting 
forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison shall deliver a 
true copy of the commitment to the jail or prison and shall make the officer's return on the 
commitment and file it with the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at 
any time. 
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose sentence in 
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court retains jurisdiction over a 
mentally ill offender committed to the Department of Human Services as provided by Utah 
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Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b), the court shall so specify in the sentencing order. 
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UTAH R. CIV. P. 58A 
RULE 58A. ENTRY OF JUDGMENT; ABSTRACT OF JUDGMENT 
(a) Judgment upon the verdict of a jury. Unless the court otherwise directs and subject to 
Rule 54(b), the clerk shall promptly sign and file the judgment upon the verdict of a jury. 
If there is a special verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories 
returned by a jury, the court shall direct the appropriate judgment, which the clerk shall 
promptly sign and file. 
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided in paragraphs (a) and (f) and Rule 
55(b)(1), all judgments shall be signed by the judge and filed with the clerk. 
(c) When judgment entered; recording. A judgment is complete and shall be deemed 
entered for all purposes, except the creation of a lien on real property, when it is signed 
and filed as provided in paragraphs (a) or (b). The clerk shall immediately record the 
judgment in the register of actions and the register of judgments. 
(d) Notice of judgment. A copy of the signed judgment shall be promptly served by the 
party preparing it in the manner provided in Rule 5. The time for filing a notice of appeal 
is not affected by this requirement. 
(e) Judgment after death of a party. If a party dies after a verdict or decision upon any 
issue of fact and before judgment, judgment may nevertheless be entered. 
(f) Judgment by confession. If a judgment by confession is authorized by statute, the 
party seeking the judgment must file with the clerk a statement, verified by the defendant, 
to the following effect: 
(f)(1) If the judgment is for money due or to become due, it shall concisely state the claim 
and that the specified sum is due or to become due. 
(f)(2) If the judgment is for the purpose of securing the plaintiff against a contingent 
liability, it must state concisely the claim and that the specified sum does not exceed the 
liability. 
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(f)(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for the specified sum. 
The clerk shall sign and file the judgment for the specified sum, with costs of entry, if 
any, and record it in the register of actions and the register of judgments. 
(g) Abstract of judgment. The clerk may abstract a judgment by a signed writing under 
seal of the court that: 
(g)(1) identifies the court, the case name, the case number, the judge or clerk that signed 
the judgment, the date the judgment was signed, and the date the judgment was recorded 
in the registry of actions and the registry of judgments; 
(g)(2) states whether the time for appeal has passed and whether an appeal has been filed; 
(g)(3) states whether the judgment has been stayed and when the stay will expire; and 
(g)(4) if the language of the judgment is known to the clerk, quotes verbatim the 
operative language of the judgment or attaches a copy of the judgment. 
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UTAH CONST. ART. I, § 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and 
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have 
compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any 
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that 
examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay 
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the de-
fendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
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U.S. CONST. AMEND. V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
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U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their 
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indi-
ans not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for 
President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Ex-
ecutive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied 
to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of 
the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the 
number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one 
years of age in such State. 
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, 
or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as 
an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or 
judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have 
engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the ene-
mies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such dis-
ability. 
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including 
debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrec-
tion or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall 
assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the 
United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, 
obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the pro-
visions of this article. 
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far as the State is 
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concerned is $12.5 million. I think 
)ther it was to clear up real estate • 
I understand $15,650,347.67 that I 
when 
have 
how accurate that is and I wasn't going 
.fie number on restitution until - until I 







- if for any 
gone because 














us that the money wi 






Yeah, we just figured that Friday 
Lyway, our full intention is to pay 
Sir, I believe you. 
But the second thing is that if I am 
I am not here to complete the deal, . 
am the middle man on it. There is ] 
Lg to loan money to -
Well, let's do this. 




What kind of time table can you assure 








Do I have to wait a year? 
No. 
Do I have to wait six months? 
I'd say 60 days at most. 
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THE COURT: Sixty days at the most. All right. 
You want to go forward? I'm ready to sentence him. 
MR. NOAKES: Yes, Your Honor, we're ready to go 
ard. 
THE COURT: Well, this is what I'm going to do. 
going to give him 1 to 15 on the two second degree 
felonies; zero to 5 on the third; stay the imposition of that 
sentence. I'm going to make him do a year in jail. And then 




is the deal. Right now it's May 3rd. We'll go to June, 
and I'm going to cut you a little slack here, if you 
- we'll set a review on the 2nd of August - no, let's do 










review on the 3rd of August, 8:30 in the morning. You 
these people paid off because this money has come in in 
60 day time frame, I'll reconsider the jail sentence and 
y cut it down. You'll do a little jail. You're going to 
little punitive aspect to it, but I'm willing to do that 
some of those people have urged me to do that. And if 
don't, you're going to do the year regardless. 
MS. BARLOW: Your Honor, could we ask that rather 
him cutting checks to these people -
THE COURT: Well, I just - that's a figure of 
ch. I don't know how you want to do it. 
MS. BARLOW: If he could - if he could give a 
51 
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people, we will - we 
needs to 
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e State in the amount owing to these 
will disburse the money -
No, no, she's right. She's right. He 
the money to the State then they can pay 
NOAKES: 
e clear, I h 
the informa 
Your Honor, I - I had so far, I just 
ad - we had arranged - I've given his 
tion to our trust account, and I've made 















Well, it can go into your trust -
- our trust -
But then from your trust it will go to 
ey'11 start cutting checks. 
Okay. 
Is that okay? 
And hopefully when that does happen, 
- the victims in this case will understand that 
there will be 
any delay 





some certainly a time delay from the -
COURT: 
s. This is 
t's going to 
er funds and 
, but if the 
y as possibl 
No, no, no. We're not going to have 
going to be done as fast as possible. 
be here. It may take a couple of days 
things like that to make sure it clears 
money's there, I want these people paid 
e. And I want an accounting. So you'll 
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to provide me wi 
because we don't 
MS. BARLOW: 
if the money goes 
before the State can 
got 
the 
to hold it in his 
funds are there. 
THE COURT: 
th an accounting of monies that 
have a figure on the restitution 
Right, and we need to get that 
into his account, if he can cut 





, he' s 
account long enough to make sure that 
Well, I know that. The check's 
clear. We're going to be realistic here. But if tha 
everybody feel good, 
group here, I think, 








ail, and he may g 
MR. NOAKES: 
THE COURT: 
> telling me right 
.ly skeptical. It 




and I know some of you - we had 





y's not there, he's at least going to go 
o to prison. 
Thank you, Your Honor. 
Because, you know, I'm relying 
now and I'm really skeptical. 
on what 
I am 
just sounds like a lot of hot air. If 
'11 be a happy camper. Okay? 
Thank you, Your Honor. 
All right. We'll see you then. 
Your Honor, would it be approp 
time to set a restitution hearing? 
THE COURT: 
Barlow and you ge 
.ever amounts are 
Well, I expect you two to get t 
riate at 
ogether, 
t together, see if you can arrive at 
owed to the various people, and if you 
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can't, then I'll have a hearing. But you'll have time to do 
it between now and then. 
MR. NOAKES: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. You're welcome. 
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1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - AUGUST 3, 2 010 
2 JUDGE WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
3 (Transcriber's note: speaker identification 
4 may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
5 P R O C E E D I N G S 
6 MR. NOAKES: Call the matter of Ronald D. Udy? 
7 THE COURT: Mr. Udy. 
8 MS. BARLOW: Charlene Barlow for the State. 
9 MR. NOAKES: Chad Noakes, Your Honor. I'm also 
10 with Rebecca Skordas. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. 
12 MS. SKORDAS: Good morning, Your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: Give me the bad news. 
14 MR. NOAKES: Well, Your Honor, the gist of it is is 
15 at the present, Mr. Udy has not been able to obtain the funds 
16 that he had hoped at the last sentencing hearing to be able 
17 to make substantial restitution payments. We do want to 
18 bring the Court up to speed with respect to what has been 
19 occurring, what the current status is. I have a letter and 
20 an email, if I may approach, Your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: You may. 
22 MR. NOAKES: I'm can allow Mr. Udy directly to 
23 expand on the significance of these. And Your Honor, over 
24 the course of the last 90 days I've had continued contact 
25 with a number of Mr. Udy's creditors and I believe that the 
1 
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1 sentiments that they have now continue to be the sentiments 
2 that were expressed back then, and that is is that the 
3 majority of those individuals understand that if Dean is 
4 taken into custody today, that it's very likely that that 
5 particular business deal would fall through, given at that 
6 [inaudible]. 
7 MR. NOAKES: Mr. Noakes, give me a break. I gave 
8 him a drop dead date and I let him tell me how long it would 
9 take. Did I not? 
10 MR. NOAKES: You did, Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: It's over. It's over. 
12 MS. SKORDAS: Your Honor -
13 THE COURT: No, no, no, it's over. I gave him an 
14 oportunity. I had all these fine people from Brigham City 
15 talk to me. Some thought he was the most wonderful person in 
16 the world. Others thought he was a con-man. And others had 
17 mixed emotions about the whole thing. And so because of that 
18 and because of these poor people that had been ripped off, I 
19 said okay, Mr. Udy, when is this all going to come together, 
20 and when are you going to have your money available? And he 
21 gave me a time frame and I gave him beyond what he asked. 
22 And now it's time pay the piper. I don't believe this. I 
23 just do not believe it. 
24 I don't know how you feel about it. Do you want to 
25 express your opinion -
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BARLOW: Your Honor, I read the letter. I 
> a street address, it has a state, it has no 
, you know, clearl 
just printed up. 
eeling is 















y it's the letter with letterhead that 
Frankly; 
Udy is 
to be honest with the Court, 
probably being scammed and he' s 
this money, this latest money that he's 
people, 
That's 







on to this bigger fish that's 
instinctual feeling about it. 
is this money is not coming. 
I don't believe it is either. 
It's not coming. He's talked for over 










Your Honor, I have a -
No, no, 
s enough, and I 
in my head and I 
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15, zero 
feel so 
> going 1 
to 5 concurrent 
gations to be sent to the 
a total number with rega. 
MS. BARLOW: 
erent. We're 19; 
We don 
they're 
Noakes. I think we're go. 
no. We're not talking any 
said jail time. I've revisited 
sorry for these people who have 
to prison to be taken forthwith, 
All of the money, monetary 
board. I don't know if you 
rd to that or -
rt. We're about 9 million 
10. We talked - I talked to 
Lng to sit down and -
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1 THE COURT: Well, work it out and send it to the 
2 board if you can get it. If not, we'll have a hearing on it. 
3 MS. BARLOW: Okay. Thank you. 
4 MR. NOAKES: Your Honor, I'm sorry, if I could 
5 request clarification on the terms of Mr. Udy's commitment. 
6 My understanding is that the prison was suspended that he was 
7 sentenced to one year in the Salt Lake County Jail. 
8 THE COURT: No, I'm backing up on that. He wasn't 
9 - 1 initially said that I was going to give him a year in 
10 jail. I'm not. He lied to me. And if he lies to me, then 
11 he's going to pay the price. If - I gave him an opportunity, 
12 Mr. Noakes, and it just isn't going to work. So he's going 
13 to prison. And I did sentence him to prison, but I suspended 
14 it. Now he's going forthwith. 
15 MR. NOAKES: Would that be based on the feeling of 
16 the Court that he's lied today in the courtroom? 
17 THE COURT: No, he lied to me back in May when I 
18 gave him the opportunity and he assured me that that money 
19 would be here so he could pay off those people. He deceived 
20 me. He lied to me. He doesn't get the benefit of the better 
21 sentence. 
22 MR. NOAKES: From the standpoint of what the Court 
23 had previously indicated, my interpretation of that was 
24 simply that you had given him additional time and that if he 
25 could make that that there would be a discount., but not that 
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1 there would be additional -
2 THE COURT: No, no, no discount. I didn't say 
3 discount. I said to Mr. Udy, how long is it going to take 
4 you? Give me a time frame on this money that all this 
5 money's going to come in? Give me a time frame, and I'll 
6 give you the benefit of the doubt. Because of all of the 
7 people from Brigham City that really believed in him, 
8 although there were about half that didn't. And I gave him 
9 the opportunity and why should I make it better for him now 
10 because he lied to me, he wasn't telling the truth. You may 
11 believe it, I don't believe it. And I'm not going to put up 
12 with that. That is not right. He committed the offense. He 
13 admitted he committed the offense - offenses; two third 
14 degree felony and a second degree felony, and I was going to 
15 give him the benefit of the doubt but he did not produce and 
16 he lied to me. And I think I have a right to pull the plug 
17 on that because of his conduct. If you think otherwise, take 
18 it up. But I think it's my right to pull the plug on him and 
19 say you don't deserve the benefit of the doubt, Mr. Udy, 
20 because you don't tell the truth. And he has an obligation 
21 to this Court to tell me the truth and he didn't. So he's 
22 going to prison. One to 15, zero to 5, concurrent. You 
23 disagree, let an appellate court tell me I shouldn't do it. 
2 4 MR. NOAKES: Thank you, Your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: Right now, that's where he's going. 
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1 MS. BARLOW: Thank you, Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Your welcome, 
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